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Abstract
Consider an experiment in which subjects are asked to choose between pairs
consisting of a monetary payment and a time-delay at which the payment is deliv-
ered. Given a finite set of observations, under what conditions the choices of an
individual agent can be rationalised by a discounted utility function? We develop
an axiomatic characterisation of time-preference with various forms of discounting,
including weakly present-biased, quasi-hyperbolic, and exponential, and determine
the testable restrictions for each specification. Moreover, we discuss identification
issues which may arise in this class of experiments.
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1 Introduction
Consider an experiment in which, in every trial, a consumer is presented with a finite
set of pairs (m, t) consisting of a monetary payment m ∈ R+ and a time-delay t ∈ N at
which the payment is delivered. The agent is allowed to choose exactly one option from
the set. Suppose that we can observe both the set of feasible options, denoted by A, and
the corresponding choice (m, t). Given a finite number of repetitions of the experiment,
under what conditions can the choices of the consumer can be rationalised? In other
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words, when is it possible to determine a function v : R+ × N → R such that, for any
observable set of options A, we have
v(m, t) ≥ v(n, s), for all (n, s) ∈ A?
Clearly, without any additional conditions imposed on v, the above problem is trivial,
as any constant function would rationalise an arbitrary set of observations. For this
reason, given our setting, we focus on a class of functions which are strictly increasing with
respect to monetary payments and strictly decreasing with time-delays. In particular, we
are interested in preferences that are separable with respect to the two variables. That
is, we discuss conditions under which the observable choices of agents can be supported
by a utility function v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t), where u : R+ → R+ is strictly increasing, while
γ : N → (0, 1] is strictly decreasing. For obvious reasons, we shall refer to γ as to a
discounting function.
The separable specification of preferences seems to be especially important from the
economic point of view. The discounted utility model plays a crucial role throughout the
economic analysis and is widely accepted as a valid normative standard for public policies,
as well as a descriptively accurate representation of the actual behaviour of economic
agents. However, in the recent years an important question was raised concerning the
form of the discounting function that reflects the actual time-preferences of consumers. In
particular, alternative specifications of hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting were
proposed, which could explain various observations anomalous in the model of exponential
discounting utility, formerly dominant in economics. See Frederick et al. (2002) for a
detailed discussion concerning this topic.
We propose an axiomatic characterisation of time-preference in a framework where
the domain of choices is restricted to pairs of monetary payments and time-delays. Our
prize-time set-up is similar to the one discussed in Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982), Ok
and Masatlioglu (2007), or Noor (2011). However, unlike in those papers, we do not take
the preference relation of an agent as a primitive, rather, we assume that the observer
can monitor only a finite number of choices that the consumer makes. This restriction
significantly affects the conditions characterising time-preference. Since the observable
choices induce only an incomplete preference ordering over the space of prize-time pairs
(m, t), the question is how to extend the relation in a way that is consistent with a
certain type of utility function. Whether this is possible or not determines if a given
data set can be rationalised by a specific form of time-preference. The main motivation
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of this paper is to establish the testable restrictions of various models of inter-temporal
choice. In particular, we are interested in conditions that would allow us to distinguish
between different specifications of the discounted utility, including the hyperbolic, quasi-
hyperbolic, and exponential models.
We consider our framework to be particularly relevant from the perspective of em-
pirical applications. There are numerous examples of experiments in which subjects are
asked to choose between different monetary payments delivered with various time-delays.
This includes an extensive list of studies presented by Frederick et al. (2002, Table 1), as
well as the works by Chabris et al. (2008, 2009), Andersen et al. (2008), Benhabib et al.
(2010), or Dohmen et al. (2012). The design of the experiments allows us to apply our
results directly to the sets of observations they generate.
We begin our discussion in Section 2, where we introduce the notation as well as some
preliminary results. Throughout this paper our axiomatic characterisation is imposed on
the directly revealed preference relation induced by the set of observations. We say that
a pair (m, t) is directly revealed preferred to (n, s), whenever there exists at least one
observation of the experiment such that both options are available, i.e., they both belong
the corresponding feasible set A, and (m, t) is chosen. We shall denote (m, t)R∗(n, s).
The main difficulty of our paper is to determine a pre-order that extends the directly
revealed relation to the whole domain of the prize-time pairs R+×N. Moreover, we need
to guarantee that the ordering can be represented by a utility function that possesses
desirable properties, in particular, monotonicity and separability.
We begin by stating the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the set of
observations can be rationalised by a utility function (m, t) → v(m, t) that is strictly
increasing with respect to monetary payments m and strictly decreasing in time-delays t.
We define a partial order ≥X such that (m, t) ≥X (n, s) whenever m ≥ n and t ≤ s, which
is strict if at least one of the above inequalities is strict. We show that the set of observa-
tions can be rationalised in the above sense, whenever there is no sequence {(mi, ti)}ni=1
of pairs observed in the experiment such that every subsequent element dominates the
preceding one with respect to R∗ or ≥X , and (m1, t1) >X (mn, tn). Therefore, we evoke
a special case of generalised cyclical consistency discussed in Nishimura et al. (2013), as
well as the Rationalisability Theorem II presented in the same paper.
Given the initial result, in Section 3 we concentrate on the axiomatic characterisation
of preferences representable by a separable utility function v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t). Clearly,
as it is a special case of the previous representation, cyclical consistency is still a necessary
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condition, however, it is no longer sufficient. For this reason we introduce an alternative
restriction called dominance axiom. Roughly speaking, the condition states that exists no
collection of directly revealed preference relations (m, t)R∗(n, s) in which the distribution
of payments n, appearing in the inferior options, first order stochastically dominates the
distribution of prizes m in the preferred pairs, while the distribution of time-delays t first
order stochastically dominates the distribution of delays s.
Our approach to the characterisation of time-preference is novel. However, the tools
we use to show the necessity and sufficiency of our axioms are similar to those applied in
the classical literature on intuitive probability and additive plausibility (see, e.g., Kraft
et al., 1959 or Scott, 1964). In particular, dominance axiom has a similar flavour to
the cancellation law used extensively in this area of research. Moreover, our restriction
describing the separable formulation of time-preference resembles the condition character-
ising the expected utility hypothesis, introduced by Border (1992). In his paper, Border
concentrates on observable choices over sets of lotteries, and discusses conditions under
which they can be rationalised by an expected utility model. The restriction of ex ante
dominance, that he proposes, hinges on a specific form of the first order stochastic dom-
inance between the observable and an alternative, hypothetical choice function. Even
thought the question we consider, the framework we specify, as well as the tools we apply
are substantially different from those used by Border, the intuition behind our results is
very similar.
Having established the testable restrictions for the separable formulation of prefer-
ences, in Section 4 we concentrate on conditions which would allow us to characterise the
discounting function γ more precisely. In particular, we provide the axiomatic character-
isation of the weakly present-biased specification of γ, for which ratio γ(t)/γ(t + 1) is a
decreasing function of t. Therefore, under our formulation, the relative discounting be-
tween any two dates diminishes as they become more distant in the future. Equivalently,
this is to say that the function has a log-convex extension to the domain of real num-
bers. We consider this class to be especially important as it contains all the well-known
specifications of discounting, including hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, and exponential.
The condition characterising this class of time-preference is summarised by cumula-
tive dominance axiom. Our restriction requires that there exists no collection of directly
revealed relations (m, t)R∗(n, s) such that the distribution of payments n in the infe-
rior options first order order stochastically dominates the distribution of payments m
appearing in the preferred pairs, while the distribution of time-delays t second order
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stochastically dominates the distribution of time-delays s. The condition is similar to
the dominance axiom. However, as we require for the discounting function γ to be “log-
convex”, in order to make sure that the cumulative dominance axiom holds, we also need
to consider samples in which the distributions of time-delays are ordered with respect
to the second order stochastic dominance. Therefore, the cumulative dominance axiom
is more restrictive, as we need to verify a larger class of collections of elements of the
directly revealed preference relation while performing the test.
Finally, in the second part of Section 4, we draw our attention to an axiomatic char-
acterisations of two specific examples of weakly present-biased discounting functions,
namely, quasi-hyperbolic and exponential. The testable implications of the two spec-
ifications are similar, however, distinguishable. The essence of the two restrictions is
summarised in strong cumulative dominance axiom. Loosely speaking, the two specifi-
cation of time-preference require that there is no collection of directly revealed relations
(m, t)R∗(n, s) such that the distribution of monetary payments n in the inferior options
(n, s) first order stochastically dominates the analogous distribution of payments m, while
the sum of time-delays t appearing in the superior prize-time pairs (m, t) is greater than
the sum of delays s on the left hand side.
The results we present in this paper are not the first attempt to axiomatise time-
preference in a setting with a finite number of observations. Echenique et al. (2014) char-
acterise various forms of the time-separable model of inter-temporal choice in a framework
in which agents choose streams of a single consumption good rather than prize-time pairs.
In their setting, an observation consists of a consumption path selected by the subject and
the corresponding prices of the commodity in the periods for which the choice is made.
The authors specify both the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the set of
observations can be rationalised by different forms of time-separable preference. What is
crucial to their result, is the assumption concerning concavity of the instantaneous utility
function. This allows the authors to constrain their attention to the implications of the
first order conditions characterising the solution to the consumer optimisation problem.
Therefore, the restrictions they discuss refer to the model of time-separable preferences
with a concave instantaneous utility function. Our framework allows us to concentrate
solely on the core implications of the discounted utility theory. We dispense the assump-
tions that are not crucial to the hypothesis and characterise these observable restrictions
which are pivotal to this class of models. Nevertheless, as our set-up differs substantially
from the one adopted by Echenique et al. (2014), our results are not comparable.
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2 Preliminaries
We begin the analysis with a formal specification of our framework. Let the domain over
which the agents determine their choices be defined by X := R+ × N. Each element
x = (m, t) of the set consists of a monetary payoff m ∈ R+ and a time-delay t ∈ N at
which the payment is delivered.
Let K be a finite set enumerating the subsequent trials (repetitions) of the experiment.
In each trial k ∈ K, an agents is asked to choose one element from a finite set of feasible
options Ak ⊂ X. An experiment, denoted by E , is a collection of sets of feasible options,
E := {Ak}k∈K .
In every trial k ∈ K of the experiment the subjects are obliged to choose exactly one
element from the corresponding set of feasible options Ak. Therefore, an observation is
an ordered pair (Ak, xk), consisting of the set Ak and the option xk ∈ Ak chosen by the
agent. Given this, the set of observations from the experiment is defined by a collection
of the ordered pairs
O := {(Ak, xk)}k∈K ,
where xk ∈ Ak, for all k ∈ K. Note that our framework allows for the agents to make
multiple choices from a single set Ak. However, each such choice has to be treated as a
separate trial (“with replacement”).1 Finally, define the set of observable options by
A :=
⋃
k∈K
Ak.
Hence, set A contains all the possible pairs of monetary payments and time-delays that
the agent was offered at least once during the experiment. Clearly, we have A ⊂ X.
Moreover, since both K and Ak are finite, for every k ∈ K, so is A.
Let the set of observable payments be given by
M := {m ∈ R+ : (m, t) ∈ A}.
Therefore,M is the set of all monetary prizes that appeared in at least one option during
the experiment. Throughout the paper we shall denote the cardinality of the set by |M|,
1Note that our framework does not allow for the consumers to choose several options simultaneously
from a single set of feasible options, as the sequence in which the elements are chosen matters. Suppose
that an agents chooses two elements x and y from some set A (“without replacement”), then the cor-
responding observations are either (A, x) and (A\{x}, y), or (A, y) and (A\{y}, x), depending on which
option was chosen first.
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while m := minM and m := maxM. We define the set of observable time-delays by
T := {t ∈ N : (m, t) ∈ A},
with its cardinality denoted by |T |. Analogously, let the least and the greatest element
of the set be denoted by t := min T and t := max T . Finally, let A¯ :=M×T .
2.1 Revealed preference relations and mixed-monotonicity
In the following section we discuss properties of preference relations induced by the set
of observations O. For any two elements x and y in A, we say that x is directly revealed
preferred to y, if in at least one trial of the experiment both options x and y were feasible
but the agent decided to choose x rather than y. Formally, we will say that the pair (x, y)
belongs to set R∗ defined by
R∗ := {(x, y) ∈ A×A : there exists A ∈ E such that x, y ∈ A and (A, x) ∈ O} .
For convenience, we will denote xR∗y instead of (x, y) ∈ R∗. Whenever both (x, y) and
(y, x) belong to R∗ we will say that x and y are directly revealed indifferent. We denote
the symmetric part of the relation by I∗, i.e.,
I∗ := {(x, y) ∈ A×A : xR∗y and y R∗x}.
Similarly, we shall write x I∗y in place of (x, y) ∈ I∗. Note that we do not define the
strict counterpart of R∗.
The main purpose of our paper is to establish conditions under which the set of
observations O can be rationalised by a specific form of utility function. Clearly, one of
the necessary conditions for rationalisation is existence of a transitive closure of R∗ over
A. A complete, transitive, and reflexive pre-order R ⊆ A × A is consistent with the
directly revealed preference relation R∗ if for any two x, y ∈ A, we have xR∗y ⇒ xRy,
or equivalently R∗ ⊆ R. We shall denote the strict component of R by P , i.e.,
P := {(x, y) ∈ A×A : xRy and ¬(yRx)}.
As previously, we shall write xP y instead of (x, y) ∈ P . Finally, the symmetric part of
R will be denoted by I. Hence, xI y if and only if xRy and yRx.
For the purposes of this paper, we shall concentrate on a specific class of consistent
pre-orders. Let ≥X denote a partial order on X such that, for any x = (m, t) and
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y = (n, s) in X, we have x ≥X y whenever m ≥ n and t ≤ s. Moreover, the relation is
strict, and denoted by x >X y, if at least one of the above inequalities is strict. Loosely
speaking, we will say that option x is greater than y with respect to ≥X , if it offers a
higher payment at a shorter delay. A pre-order R is mixed-monotone, whenever for any
two elements x and y in A, x ≥X y implies xRy. In addition, if x >X y then xP y. The
definition suggests that whenever an agent is presented with two options such that one
of them has a (weakly) higher payoff and a (weakly) shorter delay than the other one,
then the former option should be preferred. Clearly, not every set of observations admits
a consistent mixed-monotone pre-order. In the following section we discuss conditions
under which there exists such an extension of the directly revealed preference relation.
2.2 Mixed-monotone rationalisation
Set O is rationalisable if there exists a function v : X → R, strictly increasing with
respect to the partial order ≥X ,2 such that for all (A, x) ∈ O,
v(x) ≥ v(y), for all y ∈ A.
In the remainder of the paper we focus on conditions under which the set of observations
can be rationalised by a utility function v that strictly increases in the value of the
monetary payment m ∈ R+ and strictly decreases with respect to the time-delay t ∈ N.
We begin by introducing the following axiom.
Cyclical consistency axiom. Set O is cyclically consistent, if for any {xi}ni=1 in A
such that xi+1R∗xi or xi+1 ≥X xi, for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, and x1 ≥X xn, we have x1 = xn.
The above axiom is a special case of generalised cyclical consistency condition formu-
lated by Nishimura et al. (2013). It requires that whenever there exists a sequence of
observable options such that every subsequent element is directly revealed preferred or
greater with respect to ≥X to the previous one, then it cannot be that the first element
of the sequence is strictly greater than the ultimate one. Clearly, the violation of this
condition excludes the existence of a consistent, mixed-monotone pre-order on A. In fact,
by Nishimura et al. (2013, Rationalisability Theorem I), cyclical consistency is also a suf-
ficient condition for the existence of such a pre-order. In order to make our presentation
more transparent, we consider the following example.
2That is, for any x, y ∈ X, whenever x >X y then v(x) > v(y).
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Example 1. Suppose that we observe the following directly revealed preference relation:
(5, 3)R∗(15, 4), (15, 2)R∗(10, 1), (15, 1)R∗(25, 3), and (25, 4)R∗(20, 2).
It is easy to check that the set of observations inducing the above relation is cyclically
consistent. In fact, given Nishimura et al. (2013, Rationalisability Theorem I), it is both
necessary and sufficient to propose a consistent, mixed-monotone relation R defined over
the observable options. For example
(15, 1) I (25, 3) P (25, 4) I (20, 2) P (15, 2) I (10, 1) P (5, 3) P (15, 4).
Clearly, the relation is both consistent and mixed-monotone.
Proposition 1. Set O is rationalisable if and only if it is cyclically consistent.
Proposition 1 is a special case of the result by Nishimura et al. (2013, Rationalisability
Theorem II), who establish the necessity and sufficiency of the generalised cyclical consis-
tency for the existence of a utility function rationalising the choice data in a general class
of partially ordered spaces. Unfortunately, their argument supporting the claim is not
constructive, which implies that the only way of verifying whether O is rationalisable is by
referring directly to the definition of cyclical consistency. Even though finite, this method
may be highly inconvenient for applications, especially when the set of observations is
large. For this reason, in the Appendix, we present an alternative, constructive proof of
Proposition 1, which introduces a more convenient method of verifying rationalisability
of the set of observations O in our framework.
The necessity of cyclical consistency for rationalisation is straightforward. Clearly, for
any function v rationalising O, and any sequence {xi}ni=1 specified as in the definition of
the axiom, we have
v(xn) ≥ v(xn−1) ≥ . . . ≥ v(x2) ≥ v(x1) and v(x1) ≥ v(xn),
which can be satisfied only if x1 = xn. On the other hand, the “sufficiency” part of the
proof is more demanding. We show the result in three steps (see the Appendix). First, in
Lemma A.1 we argue that cyclical consistency implies existence of a consistent, mixed-
monotone pre-order R over A. In Lemma A.2, we show that whenever such a pre-order
exists, we can always find a sequence of real numbers {vtm}(m,t)∈A¯ such that for any two
options (m, t), (n, s) ∈ A¯, whenever (m, t) >X (n, s) or (m, t)P (n, s) then vtm > vsn,
while (m, t)I (n, s) implies vtm = vsn. Finally, in Lemma A.3, we use any such sequence of
9
numbers to construct a function rationalising the set of observations. Every step of our
argument is constructive. Therefore, it presents a direct method of verifying whether an
arbitrary set of observations is rationalisable.
3 Discounted utility rationalisation
Set O is rationalisable by a discounted utility function whenever there is a strictly in-
creasing instantaneous utility function u : R+ → R+ and a strictly decreasing discount-
ing function γ : N → (0, 1], with γ(0) = 1, such that v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t) rationalises
O. Clearly, cyclical consistency is a necessary condition for this form of representation.
However, it is no longer sufficient. The following section is devoted to determining both
the necessary and sufficient conditions which would allow for such a representation.
3.1 Dominance axiom
A sample of the directly revealed preference relation R∗ is a finite, indexed collection
{(xi, yi)}i∈I of elements in R∗, where we denote xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si), for some
mi, ni ∈M and ti, si ∈ T . We allow for the samples to be generated “with replacement”.
That is, a single element of R∗ may appear more than once in a sample.
Dominance axiom. For any sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of R∗, where we denote xi = (mi, ti)
and yi = (ni, si), such that for any m ∈M and t ∈ T , we have
|{i ∈ I : mi ≤ m}| ≥ |{i ∈ I : ni ≤ m}| and |{i ∈ I : ti ≤ t}| ≤ |{i ∈ I : si ≤ t}|,
all of the above conditions hold with equality.
The above axiom requires that whenever there exists a sample such that the dis-
tribution of monetary payments ni, in the inferior options yi, first order stochastically
dominates the corresponding distribution of payments mi, in the preferred options xi,
while the distribution of time-delays ti, appearing on the left hand side of R∗, first order
stochastically dominates the distribution of si, then both distributions of monetary pay-
ments and time-delays have to be equal. Therefore, the axiom is violated whenever there
exists a sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of the directly revealed preference relation, with xi = (mi, ti)
and yi = (ni, si), such that the distribution of ni stochastically dominates the distribution
of mi, the distribution of ti stochastically dominates the distribution of si, and at least
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one of the two relations is strict. In order to make our presentation more transparent, we
discuss the following example.
Example 2. Consider the directly revealed preference relation analysed in Example 1.
We claim that the set of observations inducing the relation fails to satisfy the dominance
axiom. In order to show this, we need to find at least one sample which violates the
condition specified in the definition of the axiom. Take R∗. Clearly, the set is a sample of
itself. Note that, given the support {5, 10, 15, 20, 25}, the distribution of payments in the
preferred xi = (mi, ti) and the inferior options yi = (ni, si) are respectively (1, 0, 2, 0, 1)
and (0, 1, 1, 1, 1). Similarly, given the support {1, 2, 3, 4}, the distributions of the corre-
sponding time-delays are both equal to (1, 1, 1, 1). Therefore, there exists a sample of
R∗ for which the distribution of payments ni strictly first order stochastically dominates
the distribution of mi, while the distributions of the time-delays are equal. Hence, we
conclude that the set of observations O violates the dominance axiom.
The above example indicates that dominance is a stronger condition than cyclical
consistency, as there exist sets of observations satisfying the latter but failing the former.
On the other hand the dominance axiom implies cyclical consistency, as we will show in
the remainder of this section.
Interestingly, the axiom is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the set of
observations O to be rationalisable by a discounted utility function. We summarise this
result in the following theorem. The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Set of observations O is rationalisable by a discounted utility function if
and only if it obeys the dominance axiom.
In order to understand why the dominance axiom is a necessary condition, suppose
that O is rationalisable by a discounted utility function v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t). This implies
that the set is at the same time rationalisable by function w(m, t) := φ(m) +ϕ(t), where
φ := log(u) and ϕ := log(γ). Moreover, under this transformation functions φ and ϕ
preserve the strict monotonicity of u and γ respectively.
Take any sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of the directly revealed preference relation R∗, where
xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si). By the definition of rationalisation, for any element of the
sample, we have φ(mi) + ϕ(ti) ≥ φ(ni) + ϕ(si). In particular, once we sum up all the
inequalities with respect to i ∈ I, we obtain∑
i∈I
φ(mi) +
∑
i∈I
ϕ(ti) ≥
∑
i∈I
φ(ni) +
∑
i∈I
ϕ(si).
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Suppose that the sample is specified as in the definition of the axiom. Then, the
corresponding distribution of monetary payments ni first order stochastically dominates
the distribution ofmi. Since function φ is strictly increasing, it must be that
∑
i∈I φ(m
i) ≤∑
i∈I φ(n
i). On the other hand, we know that the distribution of time-delays ti first order
stochastically dominates the distribution of si. By monotonicity of ϕ, this implies that∑
i∈I ϕ(t
i) ≤ ∑i∈I ϕ(si). However, given the previous condition, the two inequalities
hold only if they are satisfied with equality. This, on the other hand, requires that
the distribution of monetary payments mi is equal to the distribution of ni, while the
distribution of time-delays ti coincides with the distribution of si.
The above argument highlights the form of consistency which is expected from a
discounted utility maximiser. As it was shown above, whenever the set of observations is
rationalisable by a discounted utility function, it can also be rationalised by an additive
utility function w(m, t) := φ(m) + ϕ(t), where φ is strictly increasing and ϕ strictly
decreasing. Take any sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of R∗, where xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si), and
construct two lotteries: one with the support corresponding to the preferred pairs (mi, ti)
and probabilities equal to the frequencies with which they appear in the sample; the
other one supported by options (ni, si) and probabilities defined by the frequencies with
which they appear in {(xi, yi)}i∈I . Whenever the agent is an expected utility maximiser,
his preference over the two lotteries should be consistent with his choices over individual
pairs. Hence, the gamble supported by the superior options (mi, ti) should be preferred.
On the other hand, due to separability and monotonicity of the utility function, any
violation of dominance axiom would imply that the consumer would rather choose the
lottery supported by (ni, si). However, such behaviour cannot be reconciled with the
discounted utility maximisation.
Showing that the dominance axiom is a sufficient condition for this form of rationali-
sation is more demanding, hence, we place the proof in the Appendix. Nevertheless, we
present the main observation used in our argument in the following proposition. The
following result plays a crucial role in the applicability of our method to empirics.
Proposition 2. Set O obeys dominance axiom if and only if there exists a strictly in-
creasing sequence {φm}m∈M and a strictly decreasing sequence {ϕt}t∈T of real numbers
such that (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies φm + ϕt ≥ φn + ϕs.
This result is implied by Lemmas A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix, as well as the ne-
cessity of the dominance axiom for rationalsiation by a discounted utility function. To
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support the above proposition we apply a variation of Farka’s lemma, commonly known
as Motzkin’s rational trasposition. Using the result, we show that the system of inequali-
ties implied by the directly revealed preference relation fails to have a solution only if the
set of observations violates the dominance axiom.
It is worth pointing out the importance of Proposition 2 for the applicability of Theo-
rem 1. The result presents an alternative way of verifying whether the set of observations
obeys the dominance axiom. In fact, the proposition states that the axiom is equivalent
to the existence of a solution to a linear system of inequalities. Since such systems are in
general solvable, i.e., there exist algorithms which allow to determine in a finite number
of steps whether a given system has a solution or not, we find the alternative method of
verifying the axiom in a much more convenient manner.
In the remaining sections of the paper we determine conditions under which the class
of preferences rationalising the data can be characterised more precisely. In particular,
we focus on finer restrictions imposed on the form of the discounting function γ. Before
we proceed with our analysis, we would like to discuss a family of experiments for which
a narrower specification of time-preference is never possible.
3.2 Anchored experiments and identification
An experiment E is anchored, whenever it consists solely of binary sets of feasible choices
A, and there exists some x∗ ∈ X such that for all A ∈ E , we have x∗ ∈ A. In other
words, in each trial of an anchored experiment the subjects are asked to choose between
one fixed option x∗ and some other element in X. We shall denote x∗ = (m∗, t∗).
There are several notable examples of anchored experiments that were performed in
the literature, including Kirby and Marakovic (1964), Coller and Williams (1999), or
Kirby et al. (1999), Harrison et al. (2002). Therefore, this class of experiments is relevant
from the empirical point of view. An important advantage of these tests is that the
choices the subjects face are relatively simple, which minimises the chance of errors made
by the agents. Nevertheless, as we show in this section, the simplicity of the experiment
substantially reduces the informativeness of the observations it generates.
Proposition 3 (Indeterminacy). For any anchored experiment the following statements
are equivalent.
(i) Set O is rationalisable.
(ii) Set O is rationalisable by a discounted utility function.
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(iii) For any discounting function γ : N → (0, 1], with γ(0) = 1, there is a strictly
increasing function u : R+ → R+ such that v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t) rationalises O.
The above proposition states that, given observations from an anchored experiment,
one can only determine if the choices of the subject are rationalisable according to the
definition in Section 2.2. Therefore, the design of the experiment does not allow to verify
whether the observable choices can be rationalised by a narrower class of preferences. In
particular, Proposition 3(iii) implies that once the set of observations is rationalisable,
it can also be rationalised by virtually any form of discounting. Hence, we consider this
class of experiments to be rather weak, as the data they produce do not allow for a
conclusive specification of time-preference explaining the observable choices.
The argument supporting the above claim is three-fold. In order to prove implication
(i) ⇒ (ii), we show that in any anchored experiment, whenever the set of observations is
cyclically consistent, it may violate the dominance axiom only if it contains an infinite
number of elements. Clearly, by definition this can never hold. Implication (ii) ⇒ (iii)
follows from the fact that any directly revealed preference relation can only be expressed
with respect to the option (m∗, t∗). Therefore, given any discounting function γ, while
constructing the utility function u we simply need to assign a value u(m) to every el-
ement m of M that satisfies u(m) ≥ γ(t∗)/γ(t)u(m∗), whenever (m, t)R∗(m∗, t∗), and
u(m) ≤ γ(t∗)/γ(t)u(m∗) otherwise, which is always possible. Implication (iii) ⇒ (i) is
obvious. The full proof of the result is presented in the Appendix
4 Weakly present-biased rationalisation
In the previous section we have determined the necessary and sufficient conditions under
which the set of observations can be rationalised by a discounted utility function. We
devote the remainder of the paper to determine restrictions which allow for a narrower
characterisation of the discounting function γ. In particular, we focus on a class of pref-
erences that exhibit some degree of present-biased. We will say that a strictly decreasing
discounting function γ : N → (0, 1], with γ(0) = 1, is weakly present-biased, whenever
function ϑ : N→ R++,
ϑ(t) :=
γ(t)
γ(t+ 1)
,
is decreasing. In other words, we require that the relative discounting between any two
subsequent periods decreases as the two dates are further away in the future. Equivalently,
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this is to say that there exists a log-convex extension of function γ to the domain of the
real numbers. Our interest in the above class is justified by the fact that it contains the
most commonly used forms of discounting. In particular, exponential, quasi-hyperbolic,
and hyperbolic discounting models are included in this family.
4.1 Cumulative dominance axiom
A set O is rationalisable by a weakly present-biased discounted utility function, whenever
there exists a strictly increasing instantaneous utility function u : R+ → R+ and a strictly
decreasing, weakly present-biased discounting function γ : N→ (0, 1], with γ(0) = 1, such
that v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t) rationalises O.
Cumulative dominance axiom. For any sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of R∗, where xi = (mi, ti)
and yi = (ni, si), such that, for any m ∈M and t ∈ T ,
|{i ∈ I : mi ≤ m}| ≥ |{i ∈ I : ni ≤ m}| and∫ t
t
|{i ∈ I : ti ≤ z}|dz ≤
∫ t
t
|{i ∈ I : si ≤ z}|dz,
we have |{i ∈ I : mi ≤ m}| = |{i ∈ I : ni ≤ m}| and |{i ∈ I : ti ≤ t}| = |{i ∈ I : si ≤ t}|,
for all m ∈M and t ∈ T .
The cumulative dominance axiom requires that whenever there exists a sample such
that the distribution of monetary payments ni in the inferior options first order stochas-
tically dominates the distribution of payments mi in the preferred prize-time pairs, while
the distribution of time-delays ti appearing on the left hand side of R∗ second order
stochastically dominates the distribution of si, then the distributions of monetary pay-
ments and delays have to be equal. Roughly speaking, the axiom is violated whenever
there exists at least one sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of the directly revealed preference relation,
with xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si), such that the distribution of ni first order stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution of mi, and the distribution of ti second order stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution of si, while at least one of the two relations is strict.
Note that the cumulative dominance axiom is stronger than the dominance axiom.
Suppose that the set of observations satisfies the former condition. Then, there exists no
sample of the directly revealed preference relation such that the monetary payments in
the inferior options first order stochastically dominate the prizes in the preferred options,
while the superior time-delays second order stochastically dominate the delays appearing
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on the right hand side of the relation. Since first order stochastic dominance implies the
second, this means that, at the same time, there exists no sample such the latter relation
is preserved under the first order stochastic dominance. Therefore, the set of observations
obeys the dominance axiom as well. However, the opposite implication does not hold, as
there might exist a collection of elements in R∗ such that the corresponding distributions
of time-delays are not ordered with respect to the first order stochastic dominance, but
are ordered with respect to the second. In other words, the cumulative dominance axiom
requires verifying a larger set of samples than the dominance axiom.
Theorem 2. Set O is rationalisable by a weakly present-biased discounted utility function
if and only if it obeys the cumulative dominance axiom.
In order to show the necessity of cumulative dominance axiom for the narrower form of
rationalisation, suppose that the choices of an agent can be explained by some function
v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t), where u is strictly increasing, while γ is strictly decreasing and
weakly present-biased. Clearly, one can always rationalise the same set of observations
by function w(m, t) := φ(m)+ϕ(t), with φ := log(u) and ϕ := log(γ). The transformation
preserves the monotonicity of the two functions, while ϕ has a convex extension to R+.
By definition, for any sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of R∗, where xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si),
we have φ(mi) + ϕ(ti) ≥ φ(ni) + ϕ(si), for all i ∈ I. In particular,∑
i∈I
φ(mi) +
∑
i∈I
ϕ(ti) ≥
∑
i∈I
φ(ni) +
∑
i∈I
ϕ(si).
Suppose that the sample is specified as in the definition of cumulative dominance axiom.
As φ is strictly increasing, we have
∑
i∈I φ(m
i) ≤∑i∈I φ(ni). Moreover, since the distri-
bution of time-delays ti second order stochastically dominates the distribution of si, the
existence of a convex extension of ϕ implies that
∑
i∈I ϕ(t
i) ≤∑i∈I ϕ(si). However, the
two inequalities can be consistent with the initial condition only if they are satisfied with
equality which, by the strict monotonicity of φ and ϕ, requires that the distributions of
monetary payments and time-delays on the two sides of the directly revealed preference
relation are equivalent.
The form of consistency that has to be satisfied by a weakly present-biased discounted
utility maximiser is similar to the one discussed in Section 3. Take any sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I
of R∗, where xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si), and construct two lotteries: one with the sup-
port corresponding to the preferred pairs (mi, ti) and probabilities equal to the frequencies
with which they appear in the sample; the other one supported by options (ni, si) and
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probabilities defined by the frequencies with which they show up in {(xi, yi)}i∈I . Clearly,
by construction, any expected utility maximiser prefers the former gamble to the latter.
However, whenever the Bernoulli utility function is specified by w(m, t) := φ(m) + ϕ(t),
where φ is strictly increasing, while ϕ is strictly decreasing an “convex”, whenever the
cumulative axiom is violated, it would be possible to construct a sample such that the
lottery over the inferior options would be preferred to the gamble over the superior prize-
time pairs.
The “sufficiency” part of the proof of Theorem 2 is more demanding. Similarly as in
the case discounted utility, our argument consists of two steps. First, in Lemma A.7 we
show that once the set of observations satisfies the cumulative dominance axiom, there
always exists a solution to a specific system of linear inequalities. In the second step, see
Lemma A.8 in the Appendix, we use the solution to construct an instantaneous utility
function u and a log-convex discounting function γ which rationalise the data. We present
our key observation made in the proof of the theorem in form of a proposition.
Proposition 4. Set of observations O obeys cumulative dominance axiom if and only if
there is a strictly increasing sequence {φm}m∈M, a strictly decreasing sequence {ϕt}t∈T ,
and a strictly negative sequence {vt}t∈T of real numbers such that (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies
φm + ϕt ≥ φn + ϕs, while for all t ∈ T , we have ϕt + vt(s− t) ≤ ϕs, for all s ∈ T .
It is worth mentioning that the proposition is important for the applicability of our
main result, as it presents an alternative method of verifying the cumulative dominance
axiom. Moreover, we consider it to be much more convenient than applying the definition
of the axiom directly.
4.2 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting
In the following section we concentrate on quasi-hyperbolic discounting functions, which
constitute a narrower class of weakly present-biased preferences. We say that the set of
observations is rationalisable by a quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility function, whenever
there exist a strictly increasing function u : R+ → R+, numbers β, δ ∈ (0, 1), and some
time-delay t◦ ∈ N such that v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t) rationalises O, where
γ(t) :=
 βtδt for t < t◦,βt◦δt otherwise.
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Note that our definition of a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function generalises the stan-
dard notion for which t◦ = 1. By allowing for the “threshold” time-delay t◦ to vary, we
are able to analyse a wider class of preferences. In particular, as t◦ denotes a time-delay
which separates the dates perceived by the agent as “present” from those regarded as
“future”, we allow in our test for this parameter to be determined endogenously.
Since in the case of a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function ϑ(t) := γ(t)/γ(t+1) takes
the value of (βδ)−1, for t < t◦−1, and δ−1 otherwise, the quasi-hyperbolic specification is
weakly present-biased. Hence, any set of observations rationalisable by this more specific
form of time-preference obeys the cumulative dominance axiom. However, it is no longer
sufficient. In this section we discuss the condition that fully characterises this form of the
discounted utility model.
Strong cumulative dominance axiom. There exists some t′ ∈ T such that, for any
sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of R∗, where xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si), which satisfies
(i) |{i ∈ I : mi ≤ m}| ≥ |{i ∈ I : ni ≤ m}|, for all m ∈M;
(ii)
∑
i∈I t
i ≥∑i∈I si;
(iii)
∑
i∈I min{ti, t′} ≥
∑
i∈I min{si, t′},
all the above conditions hold with equality.
The above condition is stronger than cumulative dominance. Clearly, in order to verify
whether the above axiom is not violated, we need to consider a wider class of samples of
the directly revealed preference relation. As previously, the samples of interest need to
satisfy condition (i). However, additionally, they have to obey restrictions (ii) and (iii),
which impose a weaker requirement on the relation between the distribution of time-
delays appearing on both sides of the directly revealed preference relation in the sample.
Therefore, a greater number of samples satisfies the two conditions then in case of the
cumulative dominance axiom.
Proposition 5. Set O is rationalisable by a quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility function
if and only if it obeys the strong cumulative dominance axiom.
The necessity of the axiom can be proven similarly as in the previous sections. Suppose
that the set of observations is rationalisable by a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function
v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t), where γ is specified as at the beginning of this section for some β, δ in
(0, 1), and a time-delay t◦. This implies that the set of observations is also rationalisable
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by function w(m, t) := φ(m) + min{t, t◦}βˆ + tδˆ, where φ := log(u), βˆ := log(β), and
δˆ := log(δ). By definition, for any sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of the directly revealed preference
relation, with xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si), we have∑
i∈I
φ(mi) + βˆ
∑
i∈I
min{ti, t◦}+ δˆ
∑
i∈I
ti ≥
∑
i∈I
φ(ni) + βˆ
∑
i∈I
min{si, t◦}+ δˆ
∑
i∈I
si.
Whenever the sample is specified as in the strong cumulative dominance axiom, it must
be that
∑
i∈I φ(m
i) ≤∑i∈I φ(ni), as well as βˆ∑i∈I min{ti, t◦} ≤ βˆ∑i∈I min{si, t◦} and
δˆ
∑
i∈I t
i ≤ δˆ∑i∈I si, as βˆ and δˆ are strictly negative. However, these conditions can be
consistent with the initial inequality only if they all hold with equality. Moreover, the
argument remains unchanged once we substitute t◦ with t′ := min{t ∈ T : t ≥ t◦}. This
requires for the strong cumulative dominance axiom to be satisfied.
The “sufficiency” part of the proof is presented in the Appendix. Our argument is
constructed around one important observation, which we summarise in the following
lemma. The result plays also a crucial role in the implementation of Proposition 5.
Lemma 1. Set O obeys the strong cumulative dominance axiom for some t′ ∈ T if and
only if there exists a strictly increasing sequence {φm}m∈M and strictly negative numbers
βˆ and δˆ such that (m, t)R∗ (n, s) implies φm + min{t, t′}βˆ + tδˆ ≥ φn + min{s, t′}βˆ + sδˆ.
Proposition 5 requires some comment. First of all, observe that the value of the
time-delay t′ for which set O obeys the axiom, determines the empirical “kink” of the
quasi-hyperbolic discounting function. In particular, this means that we do not assume
prior to the test the “threshold” date which separates the perceived “present” from the
“future”, but determine it endogenously. In fact, it is possible that one set of observations
admits various forms of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, not only with respect to the values
of the discount factors β and δ, but also with respect to the pivotal time-delay t′.
Second of all, Lemma 1 proposes an alternative method of verifying whether the set of
observations obeys the axiom. As in Propositions 2 and 4, it hinges on the existence of a
solution to a system of linear inequalities conditional on t′. Since the set of the observable
time-delays is finite, the test can be performed in a finite number of steps.
4.3 Exponential discounting
Finally, we draw our attention to the exponential discounting models. We say that set
O is rationalisable by exponential discounted utility function whenever there is a strictly
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increasing instantaneous utility function u : R+ → R+ and some δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
function v(m, t) := δtu(m) rationalises the set of observations.
Proposition 6. Set O is rationalisable by an exponential discounted utilility function if
and only if for any subset {(xi, yi)}i∈I of R∗, where xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si), such
that |{i ∈ I : mi ≤ m}| ≥ |{i ∈ I : ni ≤ m}|, for all m ∈M, and ∑i∈I ti ≥∑i∈I si, all
the above conditions hold with equality.
The above propositions states the necessary and sufficient condition under which a
set of observations can be rationalised by an exponential discounting function. Note
that the requirement significantly resembles the one stated in the definition of the strong
cumulative dominance axiom. In fact, the only distinguishable implications of the quasi-
hyperbolic and exponential model are implied by condition (iii) stated in the definition of
the axiom. Clearly, Proposition 6 imposes a stronger condition on the set of observations,
as it admits a larger class of samples that might violate it. However, whenever the strong
cumulative dominance axiom is satisfied for t′ equal to the least or the greatest observable
time-delay, then the two requirements are equivalent. Observe that, given an arbitrary
sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of the directly revealed preference relation, condition (iii) stated in the
axiom is trivially satisfied whenever t′ = t. On the other hand, if t′ = t, then conditions
(ii) and (iii) coincide. This implies, that in these extreme cases, it is impossible to
distinguish between the quasi-hyperbolic and exponential rationalisation. We summarise
the result in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Set O is rationalisable by an expected utility function if and only if it obeys
the strong cumulative dominance axiom for t′ = t or t′ = t.
We omit the proof. The condition stated in Proposition 6 differs additionally in one
substantial aspect from the strong cumulative dominance axiom. Observe that in order
to rationalise the set of observations by an exponentially discounted utility function, we
need to verify the requirement stated in the proposition only for subsets of the directly
revealed preference relation, and not samples. Clearly, this substantially simplifies the
test and reduces the number of steps required to verify the condition.
4.4 Indeterminacy of discount factors
In the following section we discuss some indeterminacy issues that arise while rationalising
the set of observations by quasi-hyperbolic or exponential discounted utility functions.
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We begin with the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Set of observations O is rationalisable by a discounted utility function
v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t) if and only if, for any a > 0, it is rationalisable by a discounted
utility function vˆ(m, t) := uˆ(m)γˆ(t), where uˆ := ua and γˆ := γa.
We omit the proof. The above result simply states that whenever a set of observations
is rationalisable by some discounted utility function, then it is also rationalisable by its
positive exponential transformation. This observation is not new, and was already noted
by Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) in their representation theorem. However, the above
proposition implies a much stronger conclusion. Namely, any property of function γ that
is preserved under positive exponential transformations, is also satisfied by function γˆ.
In particular, this means that whenever γ is weakly present-biased (respectively quasi-
hyperbolic or exponential) then so is γˆ. This plays an important role in the next result.
Corollary 2. Set O is rationalisable by a quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility function if
and only if for any β (or δ) in (0, 1) there is some δ (respectively β) in (0, 1), a strictly
increasing utility function u : R+ → R+, and a time-delay t◦ such that v(m, t) := γ(t)u(m)
rationalises O, where γ(t) = βtδt, for t < t◦, and γ(t) = βt◦δt otherwise.
Proof. We show (⇒). There exists some strictly increasing function u : R+ → R+,
discount factors β, δ in (0, 1), as well as time-delay t◦ such that v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t)
rationalises O, where function γ is defined as at the beginning of this section. Take any
β′ ∈ (0, 1), and define a := log(β′)/ log(β). Clearly, function vˆ(m, t) := uˆ(m)γˆ(t), where
uˆ = ua and γˆ = γa, also rationalises O. Moreover, γˆ(t) = (β′)t(δa)t, for t < t◦, and
γˆ(t) = (β′)t
◦
(δa)t otherwise. We present an analogous argument for the claim inside the
brackets. Implication (⇐) is trivial.
Given the nature of our framework and the above result, there is no testable restriction
for the values of the discount factors β or δ, as long as we consider the two parameters
separately. However, there exists a restriction for pairs (β, δ) of the two discount factors.
In fact, a straightforward application of the above result allows to show that the restriction
can be imposed on the ratio log(δ)/ log(β).
On the other hand, there are no observable implications for the value of the discount
factor δ rationalising the set of observations under exponential discounting. In fact,
once the choice data can be rationalised for one value of the discount factor, it can be
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rationalised for virtually any other value δ ∈ (0, 1). This observation is directly implied
by Corollaries 1 and 2.
Corollary 3. Set O is rationalisable by exponential discounted utility function if and
only if for any δ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a strictly increasing utility function u : R+ → R+
such that v(m, t) := δtu(m) rationalises O.
Even though it is impossible to determine the value of the discount factor while
rationalising the set of observations by an exponential discounted utility function, we
are still able to impose the testable restriction on this class of models. Therefore, the
conditions stated in Proposition 6 allow us to evaluate the shape of the discounting
function, but not the parameter characterising it.
Appendix
In the following section we present proofs of the results stated in the main body of the
paper. Moreover, we include some auxiliary results that are used in our arguments. First
we show that cyclical consistency axiom implies the existence of a consistent, mixed-
monotone pre-order on O.
Lemma A.1. Whenever the set of observations O is cyclically consistent, it admits a
consistent, mixed-monotone pre-order R over A.
Proof. First, we define an equivalence relation on A. We will say that elements x and y
are related to each other whenever x I∗y. Denote a typical equivalence class by [x]. We
prove our claim by induction on the number of equivalence classes. If there is a single
equivalence class of A, then let xRy for any two elements in A, which is consistent with
the revealed preference relation and mixed-monotone. Otherwise, there would be some
x, y in A such that xR∗y, y R∗x, and x >X y, which would violate cyclical consistency.
Suppose that the claim holds for L equivalence classes of A. We will show that it also
holds for L + 1 classes. Define a relation  over the equivalence classes in the following
way. We say that [x]′  [x] whenever there exists some x′ ∈ [x]′, x ∈ [x], and a sequence
{xi}ni=1 in X such that: (i) xi+1R∗xi or xi+1 ≥X xi, (ii) x′R∗x1 or x′ ≥X x1, and (iii)
xnR∗x or xn ≥X x. Clearly, the relation is transitive. In order to show that it is anti-
symmetric, assume the opposite, i.e., that there exist two distinct equivalence classes [x]′
and [x] such that [x]′  [x] and [x]  [x]′. The first relation implies that there exist some
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x′ ∈ [x]′, x ∈ [x], and a sequence {xi}ni=1 satisfying conditions (i), (ii), and (iii). The
second relation implies that there exist some y ∈ [x], y′ ∈ [x]′, and a sequence {yi}mi=1
satisfying conditions (i), (ii), and (iii). Hence, there exists a sequence {zi}ki=1 in A such
that every subsequent element of the sequence dominated the preceding one with respect
to R∗ or ≥X , and z1 ≥X zk. If the elements are ordered only with respect to R∗, then it
must be [x]′ = [x]. This yields a contradiction, since by assumption the two equivalence
classes are distinct. Otherwise, we have z1 >X z
k, which violates cyclical consistency.
Given the above argument, it follows that there exists an equivalence class [x] such
that there is no other equivalence class [x] with [x]  [x]. Moreover, the exclusion of the
equivalence class from A does not affect the relations between the remaining equivalence
classes. Construct the new set of observations O¯ in the following way. Whenever (A, x) ∈
O and x ∈ [x], we have (A, x) 6∈ O¯. For any (A, x) ∈ O such that x 6∈ [x], define set
A¯ := {x ∈ A | x 6∈ [x]}, and let (A¯, x) ∈ O¯. Note that the set of observable choices
corresponding to O¯ is A¯ = A\[x]. Since A¯ has only K equivalence classes, by the
induction hypothesis we conclude that there exists a mixed-monotone pre-order R on A¯
consistent with the revealed relations generated by O¯. We can extend the pre-order to A
by letting x′ P x for all x′ ∈ A¯ and x ∈ [x], and x′ I x, for x′, x ∈ [x].
Lemma A.2. Let O admit a consistent, mixed-monotone pre-order R on A. Then, there
are some real numbers {vtm}(m,t)∈A¯ such that for any (m, t), (n, s) ∈ A¯, (i) whenever
(m, t) >X (n, s) or (m, t) P (n, s) then vtm > vsn, and (ii) (m, t) I (n, s) implies vtm = vsn.
Proof. Since O admits a mixed-monotone pre-order R consistent with the revealed re-
lations, for any two elements x, y in A, we have either xP y or xI y. First, we deter-
mine numbers {vtm}(m,t)∈A in a recursive manner. Take any (n, s) ∈ A such that for
all (m, t) ∈ A we have (m, t)R (n, s). Clearly, such element exists. Assign any strictly
positive value to vsn and define X1 := {(n, s)} as well as V1 := {vsn, 0}.
For any j ≥ 1, assume that Xj ⊆ A is non-empty, and for all (m, t) ∈ A\Xj, we
have (m, t)R (n, s), for any (n, s) ∈ Xj. Moreover, assume that set Vj is a finite set of
strictly positive real numbers and 0. Take any (n, s) ∈ A\Xj such that for all (m, t) ∈
A\Xj, we have (m, t)R (n, s). If there exists a (m, t) ∈ Xj such that (n, s)I (m, t), let
vsn = maxVj. Otherwise, set v
s
n to be any number strictly greater than maxVj. Denote
Xj+1 := Xj ∪{(n, s)} and Vj+1 := Vj ∪{vsn}. The algorithm terminates whenever A = Xj.
In this case, denote V := Vj. By construction, for any (m, t), (n, s) ∈ A, if (m, t)P (n, s)
then vtm > v
s
n, and (m, t)I (n, s) implies vtm = vsn.
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In order to complete the proof, we need to determine the values of the remaining ele-
ments of {vtm}(m,t)∈A¯. If (m, t) it belongs to A, let vtm take the value assigned previously.
Otherwise, let vtm be any number strictly greater than maxV . We determine the remain-
ing numbers in the following way. If (m, t) ∈ A, then vtm takes the value as determined
above. Otherwise, define m+ := min{m′ ∈M : m′ > m} and t− := max{t′ ∈ T : t′ < t}.3
Set vtm = v, where v is any number satisfying
min
{
vtm+ , v
t−
m
}
> v > max
{
v′ ∈ V : min
{
vtm+ , v
t−
m
}
> v′
}
.
Finally, we show that, for any (m, t), both vtm < v
t
m+ and v
t
m < v
t−
m . If (m, t) does
not belong to A, the claim holds by construction. Therefore, it suffices to consider the
case when (m, t) ∈ A. We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose that vtm ≥ vtm+ or
vtm ≥ vt−m . This would imply, that there exists some n ≥ m and s ≤ t such that (n, s) ∈ A
and vsn ≤ vtm. By construction of {vtm}(m,t)∈A, this would imply that (m, t)R (n, s).
However, unless (m, t) = (n, s), we have (n, s) >X (m, t). Since R is mixed-monotone,
this yields a contradiction.
Lemma A.3. Set O is rational if there are numbers {vtm}(m,t)∈A¯ such that, for any (m, t),
(n, s) ∈ A¯, if (m, t) >X (n, s) then vtm > vsn, and (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies vtm ≥ vsn.
Proof. Whenever m 6= 0, construct a decreasing sequence {vt0}t∈T such that, for all t ∈ T ,
we have vt0 < v
t
m. Similarly, whenever t 6= 0, let {v0m}m∈M be a decreasing sequence with
v0m > v
t
m, for all m ∈ M. If both m 6= 0 and t 6= 0 let v00 be such that vt0 < v00 < v0m.
Finally, denote M0 :=M∪ {0} and T0 := T ∪ {0}.
For all m ∈ M0\{m}, and t ∈ T , let λtm := (vtm+ − vtm)/(m+ −m), where we define
m+ := min{m′ ∈ M : m′ > m}. Similarly, for any t ∈ T0\{t} and m ∈ M, we shall
denote µtm := (v
t+
m − vtm)/(t+ − t), where t+ := min{t′ ∈ T : t′ > t}. Finally, let {λtm}t∈T0
be any increasing sequence of strictly positive real numbers, while {µtm}m∈M0 denotes any
decreasing, strictly negative sequence of real numbers. Define function v : X → R by
v(n, s) :=
∑
(m,t)∈M0×T0
[
vtm + λ
t
m(n−m) + µtm(s− t)
]
χXtm(n, s),
with χ being the indicator function,4 where for all m ∈M0\{m} and t ∈ T0\{t}, we have
X tm :=
{
(m′, t′) ∈ X : m′ ∈ [m,m+) and t ≤ t′ < t+} ,
3That is, m+ is the immediate successor of m, while t− is the immediate predecessor of t (with respect
to the increasing order on M and T respectively).
4That is, for any set B, we have χB(x) = 1 whenever x ∈ B, and χB(x) = 0 otherwise.
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and for all t ∈ T0, we define X tm := {(m′, t′) ∈ X : m′ ≥ m and t ≤ t′ < t+}, while for
all m ∈ M0, we have X tm :=
{
(m′, t′) ∈ X : m′ ∈ [m,m+) and t′ ≥ t}, with m+ and t+
defined as previously.
Clearly, the above function is strictly increasing with respect to the partial order
≥X . Moreover, for any (m, t) ∈ A, we have v(m, t) = vtm. Hence, whenever xR∗y then
v(x) ≥ v(y). This completes the proof.
In the remainder of our paper we shall often refer to the so called Motzkin’s rational
transposition. In order to make our paper self-contained, we state the theorem below.
Theorem A.1 (Motzkin’s rational transposition). Let A be an m × n rational matrix,
B be an l × n rational matrix, and C be an r × n rational matrix, where B or C can be
omitted (but not A). Exactly one of the following alternatives is true.
(i) There exists x ∈ Rn such that A · x 0, B · x ≥ 0, and C · x = 0.
(ii) There exist θ ∈ Zr, λ ∈ Zl, and pi ∈ Zm such that θ · A + λ · B + pi · C = 0, where
θ > 0 and λ ≥ 0.
The proof of the above theorem can be found in Stoer and Witzgall (1970). We
proceed with the following lemma.
Lemma A.4. Whenever O obeys the dominance axiom there is a strictly increasing
sequence {φm}m∈M and a strictly decreasing sequence {ϕt}t∈T of real numbers such that
(m, t)R∗(n, s) implies φm + ϕt ≥ φn + ϕs.
Proof. Enumerate the elements of R∗ so that it is equal to {(xj, yj)}j∈J , where we denote
xj = (mj, tj) and yj = (nj, sj). Let µm ∈ {0, 1}|M|, m ∈M, be a vector equal to 1 at the
coordinate corresponding to m and 0 elsewhere. Analogously define τt ∈ {0, 1}|T |, t ∈ T .
Let I denote a |M| + |T | by |M| + |T | identity matrix. Moreover, let B be a |J |
times |M| + |T | matrix such that, for any j ∈ J , the j’th row of the matrix is equal
to
(∑
k≤mj µk −
∑
k≤nj µk,
∑
k≥tj τk −
∑
k≥sj τk
)
. We claim that if O obeys dominance
axiom, there are vectors ξ ∈ R|M| and ϑ ∈ R|T | such that I · (ξ, ϑ) 0 and B · (ξ, ϑ) ≥ 0.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose that O obeys the axiom, but there are
no such vectors. By Theorem A.1, there are some θ ∈ Z|M|+|T | and λ ∈ Z|J | such that
θ · I+ λ ·B = 0 (?), with θ > 0 and λ ≥ 0. Take any such θ and λ, and let λ = (λj)j∈J .
For all j ∈ J , take λj copies of pair (xj, yj) ∈ R∗ and construct a sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I ,
where xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si). Since θ > 0, for equation (?) to hold it must be that
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∑
i∈I
∑
k≤mi µk ≤
∑
i∈I
∑
k≤ni µk and
∑
i∈I
∑
k≥ti τk ≤
∑
i∈I
∑
k≥si τk is satisfied, with at
least one inequality being strict (<). Clearly, this is possible only if
|{i ∈ I : mi ≥ m}| ≤ |{i ∈ I : ni ≥ m}| and |{i ∈ I : ti ≤ t}| ≤ |{i ∈ I : si ≤ t}|,
for all m ∈ M and t ∈ T , where the inequality is strict for some m of t. However, this
violates dominance axiom, which yields a contradiction.
To complete the argument, take any vectors ξ and ϑ such that I · (ξ, ϑ)  0 and
B · (ξ, ϑ) ≥ 0. Define sequences {ξm}m∈M and {ϑt}t∈T by ξm := µm · ξ and ϑt := τt · ϑ.
By construction, (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies ∑k≤m ξk +∑k≥t ϑk ≥ ∑k≤n ξk +∑k≥s ϑk. Let
φm :=
∑
k≤m ξk and ϕt :=
∑
k≥t ϑk, for all m ∈M and t ∈ T . Since sequences {ξm}m∈M
and {ϑt}t∈T are strictly positive, both {φm}m∈M and {ϕt}t∈T are strictly monotone.
Moreover, (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies φm + ϕt ≥ φn + ϕs.
Lemma A.5. Set O is rationalisable by a discounted utility function whenever there is a
strictly increasing sequence {φm}m∈M and a strictly decreasing sequence {ϕt}t∈T of real
numbers such that (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies φm + ϕt ≥ φn + ϕs.
Proof. Take any number φ0 < φm whenever m 6= 0, and let φ0 = φm otherwise. Denote
M0 =M∪{0}. In addition, for any m ∈M∪{0} different from m, define the immediate
successor of m by m+ := min{n ∈M : n > m}. Let φ : R→ R be specified by
φ(n) :=
∑
m∈M0
[φm + λm(n−m)]χNm(n), (A1)
where χ is the indicator function, λm := (φm+ −φ)/(m+−m) for all m different from m,
λm is any strictly positive number, while Nm := [m,m
+) for m 6= m, and Nm := [m,∞).
Clearly, the function is continuous and strictly increasing. Moreover, for any m ∈M, we
have φ(m) = φm.
If t = 0, define sequence {ϕ˜t}t∈T by ϕ˜t := ϕt−ϕt. Otherwise, let {ϕ˜t}t∈T := {ϕt}t∈T .
Denote ϕ˜0 = 0, T0 := T ∪ {0}, and let the immediate successor of t in T be defined by
t+ := min{s ∈ T : s > t}, for any t different from t. Define function ϕ : N→ R− by
ϕ(s) :=
∑
t∈T ∪{0}
[ϕ˜t + vt(s− t)]χSt(s)
where χ is the indicator function, vt := (ϕ˜t+ − ϕ˜t)/(t+ − t) for all t ∈ T ∪ {0} different
from t, vt is any strictly negative number, while St := {s ∈ N : t ≤ s < t+} for t 6= t,
and St := {s ∈ N : t ≤ s}. Note that the function is strictly decreasing and takes only
negative values with ϕ(0) = 0. Moreover, we have ϕ(t) = ϕ˜t, for any t ∈ T .
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Define functions u : R+ → R+ and γ : N → (0, 1] by u := exp(φ) and γ := exp(ϕ).
Clearly the two functions are strictly monotone, while γ(0) = 1. Finally, for any (m, t) in
A, we have v(m, t) = exp(φm + ϕ˜t). Hence, (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies v(m, t) ≥ v(n, s).
The next result states an important property of anchored experiments. We apply the
following lemma in the proof of Proposition 3, presented in the remainder of this section.
Lemma A.6. Let E be an anchored experiment. Whenever O is rationalisable by a
discounted utility function, there is a strictly increasing sequence {nt}t∈T in R+ such that
(m, t)R∗(m∗, t∗) implies m ≥ nt, and (m∗, t∗)R∗(m, t) implies nt ≥ m.
Proof. Since set O is rationalisable by a discounted utility function, there is a strictly
increasing utility function u and a discounting function γ such that (m, t)R∗(m∗, t∗) im-
plies u(m)γ(t) ≥ u(m∗)γ(t∗), and (m∗, t∗)R∗(m, t) implies u(m∗)γ(t∗) ≥ u(m)γ(t). Let
u∗ := u(m∗) and γ∗ := γ(t∗), while for all t ∈ T , nt ∈ {m ∈ R+ : u(m) = u∗γ∗/γ(t)}.
Since u is continuous and strictly increasing, nt is uniquely defined, for all t ∈ T . More-
over, since γ is a strictly decreasing function, {nt}t∈T is a strictly increasing sequence.
Suppose that (m, t)R∗(m∗, t∗). This implies that u(m)γ(t) ≥ u(m∗)γ(t∗). Therefore,
u(m) ≥ u∗γ∗/γ(t) = u(nt). By strict monotonicity of u, it must be that m ≥ nt.
Analogously, we show that (m∗, t∗)R∗(m, t) implies u(m∗)γ(t∗) ≥ u(m)γ(t).
Before we proceed with the proof Proposition 3, we need to introduce one additional
notion. We will say that collection {(xi, yi)}i∈I , where we denote xi = (mi, ti) and
yi = (ni, si), is a dominant sample of R∗ whenever for all m ∈M and t ∈ T , we have
|{i ∈ J : mi ≤ m}| ≥ |{i ∈ J : ni ≤ m}| and |{i ∈ J : ti ≤ t}| ≤ |{i ∈ J : si ≤ t}|.
We say that a sample is strictly dominant, whenever it is dominant, and there exists no
subset J ⊆ I, such that for all m ∈M and t ∈ T , we have
|{i ∈ J : mi ≤ m}| ≤ |{i ∈ J : ni ≤ m}| and |{i ∈ J : ti ≤ t}| ≥ |{i ∈ J : si ≤ t}|.
Clearly, whenever the sample is dominant and such subset exists, then {(xi, yi)}i∈I\J is
also dominant. It is straightforward to show that for any dominant sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I
such that either |{i ∈ J : mi ≥ m}| < |{i ∈ J : ni ≥ m}|, for some m ∈ M, or
|{i ∈ J : ti ≤ t}| < |{i ∈ J : si ≤ t}|, for some t ∈ T , has a strictly dominant sub-sample.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove (i)⇒ (ii) by contradiction. Suppose that O is cyclically
consistent, but there is a sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I , where xi = (mi, ti) and yi = (ni, si), such
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that for all m ∈ M and t ∈ T , we have |{i ∈ J : mi ≥ m}| ≥ |{i ∈ J : ni ≤ m}| and
|{i ∈ J : ti ≤ t}| < |{i ∈ J : si ≤ t}|, where at least one inequality is strict. In particular,
this implies that there exists a strictly dominant sub-sample {(xj, yj)}j∈J , J ⊆ I.
Take any element (xj, yj) of the sub-sample. Since it is strictly dominant, it cannot
be that xj ≥X yj. Otherwise, we would have |{i ∈ {j} : mi ≤ m}| ≤ |{i ∈ {j} : ni ≤ m}|
and |{i ∈ {j} : ti ≤ t}| ≥ |{i ∈ {j} : si ≤ t}|, for all m ∈ M and t ∈ T , which would
violate that {(xj, yj)}j∈J is strictly dominant. On the other hand, since O is cyclically
consistent, it cannot be that yj >X x
j. Otherwise, this would imply that xj R∗yj and
yj >X x
j, which would violate the axiom. Hence, for any element (xj, yj) of the sample,
xj and yj must be unordered with respect to the partial order ≥X . Therefore, either
(i) mj > nj and tj > sj, or (ii) mj < nj and tj < sj. Finally, since E is an anchored
experiment, for any element of the sample, we have either xj = x∗ and yj 6= x∗, or xj 6= x∗
and yj = x∗. Take any pair (xj, yj) from the sample and consider the following claims.
Claim 1: If xj = x∗, nj > (<) m∗, and sj > (<) t∗, then there is some (xk, yk) in
the sample such that mk ≥ (≤) nj and tk > (<) sj, or mk > (<) nj and tk ≥ (≤) sj.
We prove the claim outside the brackets. Since the sample is dominant, it contains
some (xk, yk) such that tk ≥ sj. Since E is an anchored experiment, this implies that
yk = x∗. First, suppose that tk ≥ sj and mk < nj. Then yj >X xk. However, since
xk R∗ x∗ R∗yj, this would violate cyclical consistency. On the other hand, whenever
mk = nj and tk = sj, we have xk = yj and yk = xj. In particular, this implies that for
all m ∈ M and t ∈ T , we have |{i ∈ {j, k} : mi ≤ m}| = |{i ∈ {j, k} : ni ≤ m}| and
|{i ∈ {j, k} : ti ≤ t}| = |{i ∈ {j, k} : si ≤ t}|, which contradicts that {(xj, yj)}j∈J is
strictly dominant. Therefore, it must be either mk ≥ nj and tk > sj, or mk > nj and
tk ≥ sj. In order to prove the version in the brackets, note that the sample must contain
some (xk, yk) such that mk ≤ nj. The rest of the argument is analogous.
Claim 2: If yj = x∗, mj > (<) m∗, and tj > (<) t∗, then there is some (xk, yk) in the
sample such that nk ≥ (≤) mj and sk > (<) tj, or nk > (<) mj and sk ≥ (≤) tj. We
prove the claim analogously to Claim 1.
Given Claims 1 and 2, there exists a sequence {xk}Kk=1 in A such that for any two
subsequent elements xk = (mk, tk) and xk+1 = (mk+1, tk+1), we have mk ≥ mk+1 and
tk ≥ tk+1, where at least one of the above inequalities is strict. Clearly, since A is finite,
there exists the final element xK of the sequence, for which there is no y = (n, s) in A such
that mK ≥ n and tK ≥ s (with at least one inequality being strict). However, by Claims
1 and 2, this contradicts the existence of a properly embedded sample of R∗. Therefore,
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given that O obeys cyclical consistency, there is no dominant sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of R∗
such that, for some m ∈M or t ∈ T , we have |{i ∈ J : mi ≥ m}| < |{i ∈ J : ni ≥ m}| or
|{i ∈ J : ti ≤ t}| < |{i ∈ J : si ≤ t}|. Hence, dominance axiom is satisfied. By Theorem
1, this implies that set of observations O is rationalisable by a discounted utility function.
To show (ii) ⇒ (iii), assume that (ii) holds. By Lemma A.6, there exists a strictly
increasing sequence of numbers {nt}t∈T such that for any x ∈ A, where x = (m, t),
whenever xR∗x∗ then m ≥ nt, and x∗R∗x implies m ≤ nt. Take any number u∗ > 0 and
a discounting function γ : N→ (0, 1], with γ(0) = 1. Let γ∗ := γ(t∗) and ut := u∗γ∗/γ(t).
As γ is strictly decreasing, sequence {ut}t∈T is strictly increasing and positive.
Whenever nt 6= 0, set n0 = 0, and let u0 be any strictly positive number such that
u0 < ut. Otherwise, let n0 = nt and u0 = ut. Denote T0 := T ∪{0}. Finally, for all t ∈ T0
different from t, let the immediate successor of t be defined by t+ := min{s ∈ T : s > t}.
We define function u : R+ → R+ by
u(m) :=
∑
t∈T0
[ut + λt(m− nt)]χNt(m),
where λj = (ut+ − ut)/(nt+ − nt) for all t 6= t, λt is any strictly positive number, and
Nt := [nt, nt+), for all t 6= t, while Nt := [nt,∞). Clearly, the function is continuous and
strictly increasing. Moreover, by construction, for all t ∈ T , we have u(nt) = ut.
To complete this part of the proof, suppose that for some x ∈ A, we have xR∗x∗,
where x = (m, t). By assumption, it must be that m ≥ nt. By monotonicity of u, we
have u(m) ≥ u(nt) = u∗γ∗/γ(t), which implies that u(m)γ(t) ≥ φ∗γ∗ = u(m∗)γ(t∗).
Analogously, we show that if x∗ R∗x then u(m∗)γ(t∗) ≥ u(m)γ(t).
In order to complete the proof, note that implication (iii) ⇒ (i) holds trivially, since
any set rationalisable by a discounted utility function is rational.
In the following two lemmas we prove the sufficiency of the cumulative dominance
axiom for rationalisation by a weakly present-biased discounted utility function.
Lemma A.7. Whenever O obeys the cumulative dominance axiom, there is a strictly
increasing sequence {φm}m∈M, a strictly decreasing sequence {ϕt}t∈T , and a strictly neg-
ative sequence {vt}t∈T of real numbers such that (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies φm+ϕt ≥ φn+ϕs,
while for all t ∈ T , we have ϕt + vt(s− t) ≤ ϕs, for all s ∈ T .
Proof. Enumerate the elements of R∗ such that it is equal to {(xj, yj)}j∈J , where xj =
(mj, tj) and yj = (nj, sj). In addition, define the immediate successor of t in T by
t+ := min{t′ ∈ T : t′ > t}, for all t ∈ T different from t, while t¯+ := t+ 1.
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For any m ∈ M, let µm ∈ {0, 1}|M| be a vector that takes the value of 1 at the
coordinate corresponding tom, and 0 elsewhere. Moreover, for any t ∈ T , let τt ∈ {0, 1}|T |
be a vector taking the value of (t+ − t) at the coordinate corresponding to t, and 0 in all
the remaining entries.
By I we denote a |M| + |T | by |M| + |T | identity matrix. Moreover, let B1 be a
|J | times |M| matrix such that, for any j ∈ J , the j’th row of the matrix is equal to(∑
k≤mj µk −
∑
k≤nj µk
)
. Similarly, let B2 be a |J | by |T | matrix where the j’th row is
equal to
(∑
k≥tj τk −
∑
k≥sj τk
)
. Define B3 as a |T | − 1 times |M| matrix with every
entry equal to 0. Finally, B4 is a matrix of dimensions |T | − 1 by |T |, where each
column corresponds to one element in T and each row corresponds to an element in
T \{t}. Moreover, for each row corresponding to time-delay t, the entry in the column
corresponding to t is equal to 1, while the entry in the column corresponding to t+ is
equal to −1. We set all the remaining entries to be equal to 0. We use the above matrices
to construct a |J |+ |T | − 1 times |M|+ |T | matrix B, defined by
B :=
 B1 B2
B3 B4
 .
We claim that whenever O obeys the cumulative dominance axiom, there exist vectors
ξ ∈ R|M| and ϑ ∈ R|T | such that I · (ξ, ϑ) 0 and B · (ξ, ϑ) ≥ 0.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose thatO obeys the cumulative dominance
axiom, but there are no such vectors. Theorem A.1 implies that there are some θ ∈
Z|M|+|T | and λ ∈ Z|J |+|T |−1 such that θ · I+ λ ·B = 0, where θ > 0 and λ ≥ 0. Take any
such vectors and denote λ = (λ, λ), where λ = (λj)j∈J and λ = (λt)t∈T \{t}, so that every
coordinate of λ corresponds to a single element in R∗, while each entry of λ corresponds
to a time-delay t 6= t. Moreover, let B := [B1 B2], while B := [B3 B4]. Clearly, we have
θ · I+ λ ·B + λ ·B = 0 (?).
Construct a sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of R∗ by taking λj copies of pair (xj, yj) from the
directly revealed preference relation, for each j ∈ J . Since θ > 0, for condition (?) to
hold, it must be that λ ·B < −λ ·B. This implies that, ∑i∈I∑k≤mi µk ≤∑i∈I∑k≤ni µk.
Hence, for all m ∈M, we have |{i ∈ I : mi ≤ m}| ≥ |{i ∈ I : mi ≤ m}|.
Moreover, we require that λ · B ≤ ∑i∈I∑k≥si τk − ∑i∈I∑k≥ti τt. Note that by
definition,
∑
i∈I
∑
k≥ti τt =
∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : ti ≤ z}|dz, for all t ∈ T . Hence, in particular,
the initial condition implies that
λt ≤
∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : si ≤ z}|dz −
∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : ti ≤ z}|dz.
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Since λt ≥ 0, we have
∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : ti ≤ z}|dz ≤ ∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : si ≤ z}|dz. Denote the
immediate predecessor of t in T by t− := max{s ∈ T : s < t}. Take any t ∈ T , different
from t, and suppose that
λt− ≤
∫ t
t
|{i ∈ I : si ≤ z}|dz −
∫ t
t
|{i ∈ I : ti ≤ z}|dz. (A2)
For inequality (?) to hold, we require that
λt − λt− ≤
∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : si ≤ z}|dz −
∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : ti ≤ z}|dz.
Given the initial condition (A2), this implies that
λt ≤
∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : si ≤ z}|dz −
∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : ti ≤ z}|dz.
Since λt+ ≥ 0, we have
∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : ti ≤ z}|dz ≤ ∫ t+
t
|{i ∈ I : si ≤ z}|dz. By induction,
we conclude that the condition holds for all t ∈ T .
Recall that θ > 0. Therefore, for (?) to hold, it must be that at least one of the
above inequalities is strict. However, this violates the cumulative dominance axiom.
Contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that there exist vectors ξ and ϑ such that I ·
(ξ, ϑ) 0 and B · (ξ, ϑ) ≥ 0.
Take any pair (ξ, ϑ) satisfying the above system of inequalities. Define {ξm}m∈M and
{ϑt}t∈T by ξm := µm · ξ and ϑt := τt · ϑ respectively. Clearly, both sequences are strictly
positive, while (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies ∑k≤m ξk +∑k≥t ϑk ≥ ∑k≤n ξk +∑k≥s ϑk. Next,
define {φm}m∈M by φm :=
∑
k≤m ξk. As {ξm}m∈M is strictly positive, the above sequence
is strictly increasing. Similarly, construct {ϕt}t∈T , where ϕt :=
∑
k≥t ϑk, which is strictly
decreasing. Finally, (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies φm + ϕt ≥ φn + ϕs.
In order to complete the proof, define vt := −ϑt/(t+ − t), for all t ∈ T . By definition
of {ϑt}t∈T , sequence {vt}t∈T is strictly negative and (weakly) increasing. We need to
show that for all t ∈ T , we have ϕt + vt(s− t) ≤ ϕs, for all s ∈ T . Clearly, the inequality
holds whenever s = t. Assume that s > t. By definition of ϕt, we have
ϕt + vt(s− t) = −
∑
r≥t
(r+ − r)vr + vt(s− t)
= −
∑
r≥t
(r+ − r)vr + vt
∑
s>r≥t
(r+ − r)
=
∑
s>r≥t
(r+ − r)(vt − vr)−
∑
r≥s
(r+ − r)vr
≤ −
∑
r≥s
(r+ − r)vr
= ϕs,
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where the inequality follows form the fact that {vt}t∈T is an increasing sequence. Using
a similar argument, we can show that the same condition holds for any s < t.
Lemma A.8. Set O is rationsalisable by a weakly present-biased discounted utility func-
tion, whenever there is a strictly increasing sequence {φm}m∈M, a strictly decreasing
sequence {ϕt}t∈T , and a strictly negative sequence {vt}t∈T of real numbers such that
(m, t)R∗(n, s) implies φm+ϕt ≥ φn+ϕs, while for all t ∈ T , we have ϕt+vt(s− t) ≤ ϕs,
for all s ∈ T .
Proof. Define function φ : R+ → R as in (A1). Whenever t = 0, construct a sequence
{ϕ˜t}t∈T , where ϕ˜t := ϕt − ϕt. Otherwise, let {ϕ˜t}t∈T be equal to {ϕt}t∈T . Moreover,
denote ϕ˜0 = 0 and T0 := T ∪ {0}. Define function ϕ¯ : R→ R−, by
ϕ¯(s) := max
t∈T0
{ϕ˜t + vt(s− t)}.
Note that, by definition of {ϕt}t∈T and {vt}t∈T , the above function is strictly decreasing,
and convex. Hence, function ϑ(t) := ϕ(t)−ϕ(t+1) is also decreasing. Moreover, we have
ϕ¯(t) = ϕ˜t, for all t ∈ T . Finally, the above properties hold once we restrict ϕ¯ to N.
Define functions u : R+ → R+ and γ : N → (0, 1] by u := exp(φ) and γ := exp(ϕ¯)
respectively. Clearly, the two functions are strictly monotone, while γ is log-convex with
γ(0) = 1. Moreover, we have v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t) = exp(φm + ϕ˜t), for any (m, t) ∈ A.
Whenever (m, t)R∗(n, s) then φm+ϕ˜t ≥ φn+ϕ˜s, which implies that v(m, t) ≥ v(n, s).
Next, we present the two lemmas that support the sufficiency of the strong cumulative
dominance axiom for rationalisability. At the same time, the two results complete the
proof of Proposition 5.
Lemma A.9. Whenever O obeys strong cumulative dominance axiom for some t′ ∈ T ,
there exists a strictly increasing sequence {φm}m∈M and strictly negative numbers βˆ and
δˆ such that (m, t)R∗ (n, s) implies φm + min{t, t′}βˆ + tδˆ ≥ φn + min{s, t′}βˆ + sδˆ.
Proof. Take any t ∈ T for which O obeys strong cumulative dominance axiom. Take any
sample {(xj, yj)}j∈J of R∗, where xj = (mj, tj) and yj = (nj, sj). For any m ∈ M, let
µm ∈ {0, 1}|M| be a vector that takes the value of 1 at the coordinate corresponding to
m, and 0 everywhere else. Let I denote a |M| + 2 by |M| + 2 a diagonal matrix, where
for the first |M| rows the corresponding entries are equal to 1, while for the last two are
equal to −1. Let B be a |J | times |M| + 2 matrix such that, for any j ∈ J , its j’th
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row is equal to (
∑
k≤mj µk −
∑
k≤nj µk, t
j − sj,min{tj, t′} − min{sj, t′}). We claim that
there exists a vector ξ ∈ R and real numbers βˆ and δˆ such that I · (ξ, δˆ, βˆ)  0 and
B · (ξ, δˆ, βˆ) ≥ 0.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose that there are no such vectors. By
Theorem A.1, there is some θ ∈ Z|M|+2 and λ ∈ Z|J | such that θ · I + λ · B = 0, where
θ > 0 and λ ≥ 0. Take any such vectors and denote λ = (λj)Jj=1. Construct sample
{(xi, yi)}i∈I by taking λj copies of pair (xj, yj) from of R∗, for all j ∈ J . Since θ > 0,
for condition (?) to hold, it must be that
∑
i∈I
∑
k≤mi µk ≤
∑
i∈I
∑
k≤ni µm, as well as∑
i∈I t
i ≥∑i∈I sj, ∑i∈I min{ti, t′} ≥∑i∈I min{si, t′}, with at least one inequality being
strict. However, this contradicts the strong cumulative dominance axiom.
Take any ξ and δˆ, βˆ satisfying I · (ξ, δˆ, βˆ)  0 and B · (ξ, δˆ, βˆ) ≥ 0. Define sequence
{ξm}m∈M by ξm := µm · ξ. By construction of matrix B, whenever (m, t)R∗(n, s) then∑
k≤m ξk + tδˆ + min{t, t′}βˆ ≥
∑
k≤n ξk + sδˆ + min{s, t′}βˆ. Define sequence {φm}m∈M by
φm :=
∑
k≤m ξk. Since {ξm}m∈M is strictly positive, {φm}m∈M is strictly increasing and
satisfies the property specified in the lemma.
Lemma A.10. Set O is rationalisable by a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function if there
is some t′ ∈ T , a strictly increasing sequence {φm}m∈M and strictly negative numbers βˆ
and δˆ such that (m, t)R∗ (n, s) implies φm + tδˆ + min{t, t′}βˆ ≥ φn + sδˆ + min{s, t′}βˆ.
Proof. Construct function φ : R+ → R as in (A1). Recall that the function is continuous
and strictly increasing. Moreover, for any m ∈ M, we have φ(m) = φm. Define function
u : R+ → R+ by u := exp(φ). Moreover, let δ := exp(δˆ), β := exp(βˆ), and t◦ := t′. Define
function γ : N → (0, 1] by γ(t) := βtδt, whenever t < t◦, and γ(t) := βt◦δt otherwise.
Clearly, we have γ(0) = 1. Moreover, for any prize-time pair (m, t) ∈ A, we have
v(m, t) := u(m)γ(t) = exp(φm + tδˆ + min{t, t◦}βˆ). Therefore, whenever (m, t)R∗(n, s)
holds, then v(m, t) ≥ v(n, s). The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 6. We can show the necessity of the conditions stated in the propo-
sition analogously to quasi-hyperbolic case. In order to show sufficiency, enumerate the
elements of R∗ such that is is equal to {(xj, yj)}j∈J , where xj = (mj, tj) and yj = (nj, sj).
For each m ∈M, let µm ∈ {0, 1}|M| be a vector with all entries equal to zero, apart from
the one corresponding to m equal to 1. Moreover, denote the immediate successor of m
in M by m+ := min{n ∈ M : n > m}, for all m 6= m. Let A be a |M| by |M| + 1
matrix constructed as follows. Each of the first |M| − 1 rows is equal to (µm+ − µm, 0),
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while the |M|+ 1’th entry of the |M|’th row is equal to −1. Let B be a |J | by |M|+ 1
matrix, where for each j ∈ J , its j’th row is equal to (µmj − µnj , tj − sj). We claim that
whenever O obeys the condition stated in the proposition, there is a vector φ ∈ R|M| and
a number δˆ such that A · (φ, δˆ) 0 and B · (φ, δˆ) ≥ 0.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose that O the condition, but the above
system of inequalities has no solution. By Theorem A.1, there exists θ ∈ Z|M| and
λ ∈ Z|J |, with θ > 0 and λ ≥ 0, such that θ ·A+λ ·B = 0 (?). Take any such vectors and
denote λ = (λj)
J
j=1. Construct a sample {(xi, yi)}i∈I of R∗, by taking λj times each pair
(xj, yj). By definition of matrices A and B, whenever (?) is satisfied, the above sample
can be partitioned into subsets {(xk, yk)}k∈K of R∗ such that, for all m ∈ M, we have
|{k ∈ K : mk ≤ m}| ≥ |{k ∈ K : nk ≤ m}|. Moreover, it must be that ∑i∈I ti ≥∑i∈I si.
However, this contradicts the condition stated in the axiom.
Take any φ and δˆ such that A · (φ, δˆ)  0 and B · (φ, δˆ) ≥ 0, and define sequence
{φm}m∈M by φm := µm · φ. Clearly, it is strictly increasing, while (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies
φm + δˆt ≥ φn + δˆs. Construct function φ : R+ → R as in (A1), which is continuous
and strictly increasing and, for any m ∈ M, we have φ(m) = φm. Define function
u : R+ → R+ by u := exp(φ), and let δ = exp(δˆ). Clearly, for any (m, t) ∈ A, we have
v(m, t) := δtu(m) = exp(φm − tδˆ). Hence, (m, t)R∗(n, s) implies v(m, t) ≥ v(n, s).
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